Post #58918

🧵Thread about general stuff and ranting Initially I wanted to discuss the philosophical question of the righteous armed struggle against Israel, but then I decided this is long overdue and futile today. I also considered laying the justification of the correct behavior of the Lebanese resistance from 2006 to 2011-2027 and then in 2023, but then decided that I could not convince whoever is not convinced already. Humanity's most important skill is adaptation, and this includes adapting to accept lies as truth. How should I explain to someone why Hezbullah's actions in Syria were legitimate and the organization did not go there to kill Syrian children, when Syrian hunting grounds could have been 500 km closer in Beruit's Dahyeh if that were the intention? How do you explain to someone that those ruling Syria today are only as relatively tame as they are now thanks the blows and extreme setbacks they faced as a result of Hezbullah, Iran and their allies' interference? These rebels had sent car bombs and suicide bombers into Lebanese neighborhoods and markets as early as 2013 and set their sights on Beqaa valley as early as 2011-2012. The evidence is clear once bias is set aside. The only mistake I believe Hezbullah has in regards to Syria is not actively influencing the corrupt leadership in Syria, whose mismanagement was the sole reason of the collapse in 2023, despite the tremendous success that won the war in 2018. This corruption led to Hezbullah's demise as a regional power, and ended any hopes for the organization to regain its status or enough power to threaten Israel's north in an existential battle. This loss not only weakened Hezbullah, it ensured Hezbullah will be oppressed and isolated in Lebanon as evidently recorded today, with the actions of the Lebanese government. I discussed Syria before, as well as the previous wars, especially 2023-2024. Please read them, they have answers and information that is worth knowing. I could write a book detailing that all, but I neither have the time nor the will to do so. The Shia of Lebanon are losing a lot by failing to write enough books to document their era from scholarship to resistance. This will come back to bite us in the future decades. What I want to discuss today, as the war in south Lebanon has reached a critical point with the Israeli army almost passing the first line of border villages, is: What is next? Why did this war start now? Did Hezbullah make a mistake? What will Israel do, and what can it achieve? My stance about the might of the Israeli army is clear to all: I do believe they have reached, in the past 2 decades, a state where they've perfected their means of defense and offense with the support of a U.S. umbrella to a large extent, and an Arab umbrella to a lesser extent. This allowed them to navigate challenges with much more ease than before, because the costs endured never hit the thresholds that would force them stop or lose a war. At the end of the day, a war can continue until you lose the means for it. Those means are ammunition or will to fight. For decades, all armed resistance factions fought Israel on the basis that they can defeat it by winning battles and outlasting the IDF. This is evident in both the rhetoric and how they classified battles since the 1960's. Israel lost its wars because it lost the will to fight, either because of its sensitivity to human losses or because of internal or foreign pressure that devastated morale or ability to go further. Otherwise? Israel had the soldiers, tanks, and bullets to go even further, and fight until they not only reached Beirut but reached Tripoli. For us, for them, for anyone, a loss in the will to fight is a defeat with no objections. The only caveat is that any defeat that is not accompanied by extensive material losses allows the military to regenerate stronger, finding problems and building the tools required to solve them.