Post #58921

No, this is not because of Hezbullah's actions in 2023; that war ended with a clear ceasefire agreement, which Israel violated as acknowledged by US, France, UN and even Lebanon's Aoun and Nawaf. Yet no one did anything. Think about this war as not a war of choice, but as one forced on us. If our will surpasses that of Israel's, we secure stability again. If we fail, we reach the same outcome we would have even had this war not taken place. However, the sacrifices will be great. Back to my point, the Israeli actions in south Lebanon of demolishing border towns was intended to ensure Hezbullah can no longer come back to these towns. After all, Hezbullah in south Lebanon simply consists of village locals which, during war, are supplemented by 1-2 groups of Ridwan forces. That is it. Some towns barely have 24 defenders including Hezbullah's Ridwan--that may or may not be able to arrive on time. These border towns barely had any locals for 15 months and rarely any Hezbullah members, let alone small arms. Therefore, the moment this war started, any Israeli advance from Naqoura to Aita, in Khiyam and Taybeh, was not only expected, but one would be foolish to assume was not destined. These towns are by all means considered not only a military burden, they are practically undefendable. This is why Hezbullah had arranged a limited number of fighters to be available on the front lines, with most engagements occurring from a distance. This strategy is the most suitable for what is possible, yet ensures that the advance will be as slow as possible. Slowing the advance as much as 3 weeks for few towns that were demolished and bombed for 2 years is great work. I'm not saying they are not critical losses--they are. But these towns were softened even before the invasion of 2024, so imagine today. Leabnese towns are also separated by large fields, which makes sending reinforcements very hard, and this is why the Israeli army can move fast enough in some lands, and why the areas under its control will appear bigger. However, it's mostly no man's land. The IDF has D-9s, tanks, vehicles, helicopters, and jets. The bare minimum is that they reach 20 km with ease after such bombing efforts on these towns, with valleys that do not have a single trench or defense line that you may commonly see anywhere else. This is the nature of war in South Lebanon. The battle should intensify when Israel tries to go to bigger towns such as Bint Jbeil. However like Khiyam, it might also fall. The battle today is to make each attempt costly and thus foil the next objective. Litani river is a rock's throw away from the Galilee tip but 10s of kilometers away from the western sector. How the IDF drives this war does not matter, and the Litani river is within reach, although a small negligible part of it. I doubt the IDF will reach the Litani in the full sense. They wont fight in major cities like Nabatiyeh and Tyre. They will at most, for now, try to reach the second line of villages and attempt to achieve a secure 5-7 km buffer zone. To win this war, Hezbullah has to make the IDF pay dearly for every town they attack and take, and ensure no presence in any town is secure enough. Israeli demolitions are the single most important point of failure for them, as each demolition is a chance to kill a dozen soldiers. With just enough hits, Hezbullah can strike enough fear to change the tide of this war. For now, Hezbullah's efforts showcase they were able to restore critical C3 abilities (command, control, and communication). They are effectively coordinating the war effort to lead the defense of the towns with the available resources, noting an abundance of ATGMs, and FPVs oddly only on the Qawzah front (why only there bro). They also showcased good disbursement of ammo caches, as we did not record a single Israeli attack with secondary explosions in any house they attacked so far, contrary to what we witnessed in 2023 and 2024 and even 2025. Hezbullah is able to fire more rockets more often that before, and has so far fired 3500 (including drones) etc etc.