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⚡️Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Concerning the Expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty(February 4, 2026) On February 5, 2026, the life cycle of the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (#NewSTART) comes to an end; it was signed by the Parties on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and was extended for a five-year period in February 2021 on the basis of a relevant one-time option provided for in this agreement. In February 2023, the Russian Federation suspended the New START Treaty against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to the absolutely unacceptable steps by the United States running counter to the fundamental principles and understandings of the agreement enshrined in its preamble. It was a compelled measure and an inevitable response of the Russian Side to the extremely hostile policy of the Biden administration which resulted in the fundamental change in the security situation, as well as to a number of illegitimate steps taken by Washington in the context of specific provisions of the New START Treaty, which together constituted a material breach incompatible with the Treaty being further implemented in a full-fledged manner. Among the key negative factors, it is worth to highlight the destabilizing actions of the United States in the field of missile defense, contrary to the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms enshrined in the New START Treaty. <...> Despite some obvious problematic moments, basically the New START Treaty used to fulfill its key functions. The conclusion of the Treaty and the years of its initially successful implementation helped to discourage the strategic arms race, allowing for significant reductions in the parties' arsenals. At the same time, due to the restrictions applied in this area a sufficient level of predictability was ensured on a long-term basis. <...> In parallel to suspending this agreement, the Russian Federation announced the intention to voluntarily maintain its commitment to the central quantitative limits on weapons regulated by the New START until the end of the Treaty's life cycle in February 2026. At that time, the United States followed suit, announcing its readiness to act in a similar manner. Striving to extend the positive effect of such reciprocal measures in terms of maintaining balance and certainty in the field of strategic offensive arms during the current turbulent period, our country took an additional constructive step. On September 22, 2025, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin publicly proposed that the Parties to the New START Treaty commit to voluntary self-limitations to keep the quantitative ceilings on the relevant weapons specified in the Treaty for at least one year after the termination of the agreement. However, no formal official response from the United States with regard to the Russian initiative has been received through bilateral channels. <...> It means that our ideas have been deliberately left unanswered. <...> In the current circumstances, we assume that the Parties to the New START are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the Treaty, including its core provisions, and are in principle free to choose their next steps. <...> 🇷🇺The Russian Federation remains ready to take decisive military-technical measures to counter potential additional threats to the national security. At the same time, our country remains open to seeking politico-diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue solutions, if the appropriate conditions for such cooperation are shaped. Read in full

⚡️Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Concerning the Expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty(February 4, 2026) On February 5, 2026, the life cycle of the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (#NewSTART) comes to an end; it was signed by the Parties on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and was extended for a five-year period in February 2021 on the basis of a relevant one-time option provided for in this agreement. In February 2023, the Russian Federation suspended the New START Treaty against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to the absolutely unacceptable steps by the United States running counter to the fundamental principles and understandings of the agreement enshrined in its preamble. It was a compelled measure and an inevitable response of the Russian Side to the extremely hostile policy of the Biden administration which resulted in the fundamental change in the security situation, as well as to a number of illegitimate steps taken by Washington in the context of specific provisions of the New START Treaty, which together constituted a material breach incompatible with the Treaty being further implemented in a full-fledged manner. Among the key negative factors, it is worth to highlight the destabilizing actions of the United States in the field of missile defense, contrary to the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms enshrined in the New START Treaty. <...> Despite some obvious problematic moments, basically the New START Treaty used to fulfill its key functions. The conclusion of the Treaty and the years of its initially successful implementation helped to discourage the strategic arms race, allowing for significant reductions in the parties' arsenals. At the same time, due to the restrictions applied in this area a sufficient level of predictability was ensured on a long-term basis. <...> In parallel to suspending this agreement, the Russian Federation announced the intention to voluntarily maintain its commitment to the central quantitative limits on weapons regulated by the New START until the end of the Treaty's life cycle in February 2026. At that time, the United States followed suit, announcing its readiness to act in a similar manner. Striving to extend the positive effect of such reciprocal measures in terms of maintaining balance and certainty in the field of strategic offensive arms during the current turbulent period, our country took an additional constructive step. On September 22, 2025, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin publicly proposed that the Parties to the New START Treaty commit to voluntary self-limitations to keep the quantitative ceilings on the relevant weapons specified in the Treaty for at least one year after the termination of the agreement. However, no formal official response from the United States with regard to the Russian initiative has been received through bilateral channels. <...> It means that our ideas have been deliberately left unanswered. <...> In the current circumstances, we assume that the Parties to the New START are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the Treaty, including its core provisions, and are in principle free to choose their next steps. <...> 🇷🇺The Russian Federation remains ready to take decisive military-technical measures to counter potential additional threats to the national security. At the same time, our country remains open to seeking politico-diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue solutions, if the appropriate conditions for such cooperation are shaped. Read in full

⚡️Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Concerning the Expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty(February 4, 2026) On February 5, 2026, the life cycle of the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (#NewSTART) comes to an end; it was signed by the Parties on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and was extended for a five-year period in February 2021 on the basis of a relevant one-time option provided for in this agreement. In February 2023, the Russian Federation suspended the New START Treaty against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to the absolutely unacceptable steps by the United States running counter to the fundamental principles and understandings of the agreement enshrined in its preamble. It was a compelled measure and an inevitable response of the Russian Side to the extremely hostile policy of the Biden administration which resulted in the fundamental change in the security situation, as well as to a number of illegitimate steps taken by Washington in the context of specific provisions of the New START Treaty, which together constituted a material breach incompatible with the Treaty being further implemented in a full-fledged manner. Among the key negative factors, it is worth to highlight the destabilizing actions of the United States in the field of missile defense, contrary to the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms enshrined in the New START Treaty. <...> Despite some obvious problematic moments, basically the New START Treaty used to fulfill its key functions. The conclusion of the Treaty and the years of its initially successful implementation helped to discourage the strategic arms race, allowing for significant reductions in the parties' arsenals. At the same time, due to the restrictions applied in this area a sufficient level of predictability was ensured on a long-term basis. <...> In parallel to suspending this agreement, the Russian Federation announced the intention to voluntarily maintain its commitment to the central quantitative limits on weapons regulated by the New START until the end of the Treaty's life cycle in February 2026. At that time, the United States followed suit, announcing its readiness to act in a similar manner. Striving to extend the positive effect of such reciprocal measures in terms of maintaining balance and certainty in the field of strategic offensive arms during the current turbulent period, our country took an additional constructive step. On September 22, 2025, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin publicly proposed that the Parties to the New START Treaty commit to voluntary self-limitations to keep the quantitative ceilings on the relevant weapons specified in the Treaty for at least one year after the termination of the agreement. However, no formal official response from the United States with regard to the Russian initiative has been received through bilateral channels. <...> It means that our ideas have been deliberately left unanswered. <...> In the current circumstances, we assume that the Parties to the New START are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the Treaty, including its core provisions, and are in principle free to choose their next steps. <...> 🇷🇺The Russian Federation remains ready to take decisive military-technical measures to counter potential additional threats to the national security. At the same time, our country remains open to seeking politico-diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue solutions, if the appropriate conditions for such cooperation are shaped. Read in full

⚡️Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Concerning the Expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty(February 4, 2026) On February 5, 2026, the life cycle of the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (#NewSTART) comes to an end; it was signed by the Parties on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and was extended for a five-year period in February 2021 on the basis of a relevant one-time option provided for in this agreement. In February 2023, the Russian Federation suspended the New START Treaty against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to the absolutely unacceptable steps by the United States running counter to the fundamental principles and understandings of the agreement enshrined in its preamble. It was a compelled measure and an inevitable response of the Russian Side to the extremely hostile policy of the Biden administration which resulted in the fundamental change in the security situation, as well as to a number of illegitimate steps taken by Washington in the context of specific provisions of the New START Treaty, which together constituted a material breach incompatible with the Treaty being further implemented in a full-fledged manner. Among the key negative factors, it is worth to highlight the destabilizing actions of the United States in the field of missile defense, contrary to the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms enshrined in the New START Treaty. <...> Despite some obvious problematic moments, basically the New START Treaty used to fulfill its key functions. The conclusion of the Treaty and the years of its initially successful implementation helped to discourage the strategic arms race, allowing for significant reductions in the parties' arsenals. At the same time, due to the restrictions applied in this area a sufficient level of predictability was ensured on a long-term basis. <...> In parallel to suspending this agreement, the Russian Federation announced the intention to voluntarily maintain its commitment to the central quantitative limits on weapons regulated by the New START until the end of the Treaty's life cycle in February 2026. At that time, the United States followed suit, announcing its readiness to act in a similar manner. Striving to extend the positive effect of such reciprocal measures in terms of maintaining balance and certainty in the field of strategic offensive arms during the current turbulent period, our country took an additional constructive step. On September 22, 2025, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin publicly proposed that the Parties to the New START Treaty commit to voluntary self-limitations to keep the quantitative ceilings on the relevant weapons specified in the Treaty for at least one year after the termination of the agreement. However, no formal official response from the United States with regard to the Russian initiative has been received through bilateral channels. <...> It means that our ideas have been deliberately left unanswered. <...> In the current circumstances, we assume that the Parties to the New START are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the Treaty, including its core provisions, and are in principle free to choose their next steps. <...> 🇷🇺The Russian Federation remains ready to take decisive military-technical measures to counter potential additional threats to the national security. At the same time, our country remains open to seeking politico-diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue solutions, if the appropriate conditions for such cooperation are shaped. Read in full

⚡️Déclaration du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie concernant l'expiration du Traité russo-américain New Start(4 février 2026) Le 5 février 2026 marque la fin définitive du cycle de vie du Traité russo-américain sur les mesures de réduction et de limitation des armements stratégiques offensifs (#NewStart), signé par les Parties le 8 avril 2010, entré en vigueur le 5 février 2011 et prolongé pour une période de 5 ans en février 2021, recourant à la possibilité prévue à cet effet par cet accord. En février 2023, l'application du Traité a été suspendue par la Fédération de Russie en raison de la mise en œuvre insatisfaisante de certains aspects de l'accord, ainsi qu'en raison d'actions absolument inacceptables des États-Unis allant à l'encontre des ententes et des principes fondamentaux pour cet accord consignés dans son préambule. Cette mesure était inévitable et constituait la réponse forcée de la Russie à la politique extrêmement hostile de l'administration Biden, ayant entraîné un changement radical des circonstances en matière de sécurité, ainsi qu'à une série de mesures illégitimes de Washington dans le contexte des dispositions spécifiques du Traité. Dans l'ensemble, cela a été qualifié de violation substantielle incompatible avec la poursuite de la pleine mise en œuvre de l'Accord. Parmi les facteurs négatifs clés, il convient de souligner les actions déstabilisatrices des États-Unis dans le domaine de la défense antimissile, contrairement au lien indissociable entre les armements stratégiques offensifs et défensifs inscrit dans le New Start. [...] Malgré les problèmes évidents, le New Start a globalement rempli ses fonctions principales. La conclusion du Traité et les années de sa mise en œuvre initialement réussie ont contribué à décourager la course aux armements stratégiques, permettant des réductions significatives des armes stratégiques offensives dans les arsenaux des Parties. Parallèlement, un niveau suffisant de prévisibilité était assuré grâce aux limitations en vigueur dans ce domaine sur le long terme. Animé par la volonté de prolonger, à l'heure actuelle et dans cette période turbulente, l'effet positif de ces mesures réciproques pour maintenir l'équilibre et la prévisibilité dans le domaine des armes stratégiques offensives, notre pays a entrepris une étape constructive supplémentaire. Le 22 septembre 2025, le Président de la Fédération de Russie, Vladimir Poutine, a publiquement lancé une initiative pour que les Parties au New Start s'imposent volontairement des restrictions pour respecter les plafonds établis par le Traité concernant les armements correspondants, au moins pendant un an après la fin de l'existence dudit accord. Cependant, aucune réaction officielle formalisée des États-Unis à l'initiative russe n'a été reçue via les canaux bilatéraux. 👉 En fait, il s'agit de nos propositions délibérément laissées sans réponse. Dans les circonstances actuelles, nous partons du principe que les Parties au New Start ne sont plus liées par des obligations ou des déclarations symétriques dans le contexte du Traité, y compris ses dispositions centrales, et sont en principe libres dans leurs démarches à suivre. [...] 🇷🇺La Fédération de Russie est toujours prête à prendre des contre-mesures militaires et techniques résolues afin de faire face aux menaces potentielles supplémentaires pour la sécurité nationale. Dans le même temps, à terme, notre pays reste ouvert à la recherche de voies politiques et diplomatiques pour une stabilisation stratégique globale sur la base de solutions de dialogue équitables et mutuellement bénéfiques en cas d'émergence de conditions appropriées pour une telle interaction. En savoir plus

🎙Statement by Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva Gennady Gatilov at the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament (February 24, 2026, Geneva) 📄Read in full Key outtakes: • The current session of the Conference on Disarmament takes place against the background of rapidly deteriorating situation in the field of international security and strategic stability. • The situation in Ukraine is a result of the policy of Western countries which for a long time have cultivated anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine, fostered hatred for Russia and everything Russian, suppressed Russian language, history and culture, engaged in the military development of its territory and increased the supplies of long-range weapons to the Kiev regime. • Russia has always advocated for a negotiated settlement of Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, the dialogue should be based on an equal and mutually respectful basis, where an ultimate goal is to establish a long-term peace with respect for the legitimate interests of all States and nations living in this region instead of a short truce. • The ongoing tensions in the Middle East could have devastative consequences for both regional and global security. The Israeli-US attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities, which were placed under the #IAEA safeguards, have become a serious blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. • The existing contradictions around the Iranian nuclear program can only be resolved through politico-diplomatic means. In this regard, we welcome the resumption of the bilateral dialogue between Washington and Tehran. • We note with regret that against the background of deteriorating international security environment and persistent tensions in the military-strategic sphere the US rejected the constructive Russian initiative inviting the parties to the #NewSTART Treaty to commit officially to voluntary self-limitations to keep the quantitative ceilings specified in the Treaty following its expiration. • Currently, a limited group of countries undermines the system of agreements in the field of arms control, committing numerous violations of the fundamental imperatives of the UN Charter, such as equality, respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, the resolution of disputes through dialogue. • We assign the Conference on Disarmament a crucial role in strengthening the international security architecture through elaborating multilateral legally binding agreements on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The development of an international legally-binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space remains a constant priority for the Russian Federation. • Against the background of the current international instability our common goal is to ensure sustainability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a depository State of the NPT, Russia strictly adheres to its “letter and spirit”. We attach particular importance to the upcoming 11th NPT Review Conference, which takes place in April-May 2026. • Russia, as depositary State of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, advocates for the comprehensive strengthening of its regime, including through the adoption of a legally binding protocol to the BTWC with an effective verification mechanism. • Given the continuing threats of the use of chemical substances and biological agents as weapons by terrorists, the Russian initiative to develop at the Conference on Disarmament an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism is more relevant than ever. #ConferenceOnDisarmament

🎙Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with RIA Novosti(November 9, 2025) Read in full (Telegraph) #RussiaUS#NewSTART ❓ Question: President of Russia Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian Federation is prepared to continue adhering to the restrictions established by New START for one additional year, starting February 5, 2026. Has there been any response from the United States? Did Moscow propose a meeting with Washington to discuss the post-New START period? If so, at what level? 💬Sergey Lavrov: The constructive initiative put forward by President Vladimir Putin in the post-New START context speaks for itself. It contains no hidden agenda and is perfectly clear for understanding. Its practical implementation would not require any special additional efforts. <...> The only thing required is reciprocity from the United States: we will voluntarily adhere to the restrictions only if, and precisely for as long as, the other side does the same. <...> So far, there has been no substantive response from Washington. We have been informed through diplomatic channels that “the issue is under consideration.” We have no intention of keeping persuading anyone. We believe that our step serves the interests of both parties and the entire international community. 👉 We are ready for any development of events, while hoping for a positive outcome. #Ukraine#RussiaUS ❓ Question: What is currently the main stumbling block in the negotiations with the United States on a settlement around Ukraine? Where is Russia ready to make concessions and where is it not? 💬Sergey Lavrov: <...> We are currently awaiting confirmation from the United States that the Anchorage agreements remain in effect. I would emphasise that, despite their essentially compromise nature, we have not abandoned – and do not intend to abandon – the points that are fundamental for us. ❗️ No one disputes the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or the choice made by the residents of Crimea, Donbass, and Novorossiya, who made their historic decision to reunite with their homeland through the referendums in 2014 and 2022. We likewise do not forget the need to eliminate the root causes of the conflict. #EUthieves ❓ Question: What will be Russia’s response if the frozen assets of the Russian Federation are directed to support Kiev? 💬Sergey Lavrov: <...> Such actions amount to outright deception and theft. It seems that the long-dormant instincts of colonialists and pirates have reawakened among Europeans. No matter how the scheme for seizing Russian funds is presented, there is no lawful way to carry it out. The confiscation of our gold and foreign currency reserves will not save the Europe’s protégés in Kiev <...> Russia will respond to any predatory actions appropriately, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, our national interests, and the need to compensate for the damage caused to us. We hope that Brussels and other Western capitals will still come to their senses and abandon this ill-advised venture. #RussiaUS ❓ Question: When and where could a meeting between the Russian and American delegations on mutual “irritants” take place? What about your meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio? When and where might it be held? 💬Sergey Lavrov: There are indeed many irritants in Russia-US relations, most of them inherited from the previous US administration. It will take considerable time to clear up this mess. <...> From our perspective, it is important that this dialogue should not be limited solely to embassy-related issues. We consider it essential to address broader questions, including the restoration of direct flights and the return of Russian diplomatic property. <...> Secretary of State Marco Rubio and I share an understanding that maintaining regular communication is essential, both for discussing the Ukrainian issue and for advancing the broader bilateral agenda. We remain in contact by phone and are prepared to hold in-person meetings.

📰 Trump calls for ‘modernized’ nuclear treaty after New START expires President Donald Trump has let the New START nuclear‑arms treaty with Russia lapse, confirming in a social‑media post that he will not extend the deal and instead wants experts to craft a new “modernized” agreement. New START, signed in 2010, placed the last major limits on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, capping each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed launchers. With its expiration on February 5, there is now no formal nuclear‑arms‑control pact between the world’s two largest nuclear powers for the first time in over half a century. The Trump doctrine: “New, improved, and modernized” Trump dismissed New START as “a badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated.” In his Truth Social post, he argued that the U.S. should instead design a new treaty that includes China, whose nuclear arsenal is growing rapidly, and better reflects the strategic realities of the 2020s. He did not say whether formal talks with Russia have already begun. The White House has refused to confirm reports that U.S. and Russian officials drafted a plan in Abu Dhabi to keep observing New START limits for at least six months while negotiating a successor deal. The Democratic and arms‑control backlash Democratic lawmakers and arms‑control advocates had urged the administration to at least keep observing the treaty’s limits while talks continued. Rep. John Garamendi of California said New START’s expiration had thrown the world into a “terrifying new era,” with no constraints on the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. “History has already shown us where that road leads,” he warned. The strange dance of deterrence and dialogue Even as the treaty lapsed, the U.S. and Russia quietly agreed to reestablish high‑level military‑to‑military contact, their first such channel in over four years. The communication line was restored after a meeting in Abu Dhabi between Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, head of U.S. European Command and NATO’s top general in Europe, and senior Russian and Ukrainian military officials. That hotline is meant to reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation, at a time when Russia is again pounding Ukraine’s energy grid — despite Trump’s earlier public appeal to Putin to halt strikes on Kyiv and other cities. So now the world has a paradoxical arrangement: no formal nuclear‑arms‑control treaty, but a renewed hotline between the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, and a president who wants a “modernized” deal — once the world is already on the edge again. Because the real question is not whether Trump can design a better treaty. It’s whether he is ready to live in a world where the guards are gone and the bombs are bigger. #Trump2026#NewSTART#Nuclear#Russia#US#ArmsControl#Diplomacy#Ukraine 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸

🎙Interview by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia Dmitry Medvedev to TASS, Reuters and the WarGonzo project(February 2, 2026) Key outtakes: #Venezuela • What happened to Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro is an obvious violation of all norms of international law. There can be no other description than a catastrophe for international law and international relations. • The US has its own arguments which, in my view, are legally untenable. The actions taken against the president of a sovereign state – regardless of how Americans may view him – go far beyond purely American agendas. It undermines the entire system of international relations. • I am confident that within the US itself there will be many who will analyze what happened and explain how it contradicts, among other things, American approaches. #Britain • When I visited Britain on official trips in the past, our communication was absolutely normal. Yes, there were contradictions, and it was not always easy to come to agreements, but the key point was that we communicated. • What the current British leadership is doing amounts to rabid, primitive Russophobia aimed at propping up its own electoral ratings. These are purely practical reasons – regardless of the names of prime ministers, the course does not change. And that is regrettable. • I am not even mentioning that Britain’s position sustains and nourishes the neo-Nazi Bandera regime. The desire to dismantle the Soviet Union or Russia has always existed in Britain. What is particularly sad is that the trend emerged just a few years after we were Allies, fighting shoulder to shoulder against Nazism. • Our list of grievances against the British leadership and elites is very long. Only a fundamental change in Britain's positions can ultimately lead to an improvement in relations. #Ukraine • For the stability of international relations, it is critically important that the current political regime in Ukraine – not the state, but the political regime – simply disappears. This regime is anti-Russian and hostile to Russia, built on hatred of people who do not share its ideology. • Regardless of the size of the Ukrainian state that may remain after the end of hostilities – the key point is that no threat must ever again emanate from there. No threat of revanche. Especially if such a threat is encouraged by Western countries. #NewSTART • For nearly 60 years, our strategic nuclear potentials have always been subject to certain limitations. Now that situation may change. • I am not saying this immediately means catastrophe or that nuclear war will begin, but it should nonetheless be alarming to everyone. Counting the number of warheads and deployed delivery systems is merely a way to control the situation, not to resolve the problem as a whole. Still, it is a means of verifying each other’s intentions. • Despite all its drawbacks, the Treaty is an element of trust. When it exists, there is trust. When it does not, trust is exhausted. The fact that we are now entering such a situation is, in fact, evidence of a crisis in international relations. #EnemiesOfRussia • Who is an enemy of Russia is, in essence, a philosophical question. It is fairly obvious today: those are countries that wish Russia ill – its defeat and disintegration – and state this absolutely unequivocally. • Unfortunately, these are Western countries. Particularly regrettable is that this now includes a significant number of European states. It pains me that European countries, which in terms of civilizational code are close to us, have adopted such a rabid Russophobic stance. • “Unfriendly states” is a diplomatic term usually applied when there are no hostilities. When hostilities are underway, these are enemies. Those who help wage war against us act as enemies – by supplying weapons, providing intelligence, or inputting targets, for example, into the memory blocks of missiles and other weapons. • This will forever remain in the history of our relations. Read in full (in Russian)

📰US and Russia agree to resume regular military contact The United States and Russia have agreed to reestablish high‑level military‑to‑military dialogue for the first time in over four years, both powers announced late Thursday. The deal was struck in Abu Dhabi, on the sidelines of trilateral talks between the U.S., Russia and Ukraine on ending the war, and was announced by U.S. European Command. The channel will “provide a consistent military‑to‑military contact as the parties continue to work towards a lasting peace.” High‑level military communication was suspended in the fall of 2021, shortly before Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, there have been repeated close calls: Russian drones and warplanes edging into NATO airspace, U.S. unmanned systems operating over the Black Sea and Syria, and an almost constant risk of misunderstanding turning into escalation. Now, the two sides say they want to avoid miscalculation and unintended escalation. The U.S. stresses that such dialogue is “an important factor in global stability and peace, which can only be achieved through strength,” and that it will increase transparency and help de‑escalate. Diplomacy, or nuclear‑treaty bargaining? The announcement came hours after the New START treaty expired, leaving the U.S. and Russia without a formal cap on their nuclear arsenals for the first time in half a century. Russia has said it still wants to talk, and the Kremlin has offered to keep observing the treaty’s limits — but only if the U.S. responds positively. Axios reports that negotiators were closing in on a deal in Abu Dhabi to keep key provisions in place while both sides work toward a new framework, which Trump has described as a “new, improved, and modernized” treaty. The Trump factor President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly called for closer ties with Moscow, framed the move as a win for his approach: normalizing relations with Russia while pressing for a Ukrainian peace deal and a new arms‑control framework. But in practice, the renewed hotline is less about friendship and more about necessity: when two nuclear powers hover over the same war zone, the only safe channel is one that stays open — even if both sides keep their fingers on the trigger. #USRussia#Military#NewSTART#Nuclear#Ukraine#Trump2026#Diplomacy#NATO#Hotline 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸

📰 The Nuclear Arms Control Era Is Over — and Everyone Is Going to Arms The last nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia is dead. On Thursday, New START expired, and for the first time since 1972, the two superpowers are left with no formal limits on the size or structure of their arsenals — just as both are racing to build new nuclear weapons and delivery systems that even the drafters of the original deals never imagined. The era of “managed doom” is over. The era of open‑ended arms racing has begun. Donald Trump has framed the expiration as a feature, not a bug. When asked in January why he hadn’t accepted Vladimir Putin’s offer of a one‑year informal extension, he shrugged: “If it expires, it expires,” he told The New York Times. He insisted a “better agreement” could be negotiated later — one that includes China and “other parties.” Beijing has already made clear it is not interested. The result is a triangular nuclear race where the U.S., Russia, and China are all expanding their arsenals, while the old treaties that once constrained them lie in the dust. The U.S. is preparing to deploy more nuclear warheads on its largest submarines, and to build up a new generation of nuclear‑capable cruise missiles and hypersonic platforms modeled after Russian and Chinese designs. Russia is experimenting with undersea and space‑based nuclear weapons and openly floating the idea of battlefield use; China is abandoning its old “minimum deterrent” posture and moving toward an arsenal that could rival Washington and Moscow. While the U.S. and Russia have cut their stockpiles from Cold War peaks, other countries are doing the opposite — Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Poland, and others are quietly asking whether they can still rely on the American “nuclear umbrella” — or whether they need their own warheads. Trump’s National Security Strategy barely mentions this shift. The only real acknowledgment appears in the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military power, which documents Beijing’s 600‑plus warheads, on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030. The strategy also sidesteps another danger: Putin’s repeated, barely veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The White House seems to be betting that deterrence will hold, even as the world returns to the logic of the 1950s and 1960s — when every serious politician was expected to understand the nuclear balance. Back then, nuclear weapons dominated presidential debates, front‑page headlines, and pop‑culture nightmares. Today, nuclear danger is everywhere but rarely debated. The question is no longer whether the U.S. can “eliminate nuclear weapons,” as Barack Obama promised in Prague. It is whether Washington can prevent the next arms race from spinning out of control — and whether the rest of the world is ready to join the game. #nuclear#NewSTART#Russia#China#US#Trump#Putin#Xi#armsrace#deterrence#NYTimes 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸