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Source channel @olddriverGDstudy · Post #98 · Sep 12

#舔逼三步 第一步(初舔B) 亲阴唇时要把女性的明唇尽量吸吮到嘴里,用舌头轻扫轻舔,女性会觉得阴唇部位特别有点痒,她很想你亲更多位置,亲得更广些,别理她们,你亲你的就行了,你可以趁着她们正享受着的时候,轻轻的咬一下她的阴唇她肯定会“啊”的一下惊叫,身子抽动一下,在她还没来得及说话时,你快速把嘴唇整个贴在她的阴道口,这种做法可以让女性一下子感觉到整个阴部很温暖很舒服, 刚才的那声“啊”还没叫完就变成“噢”的一轻呼了。这时开始应该动手了,你应该用大拇指轻轻的将她的阴唇向两边分开蛋出女性的阴道口,用舌头在阴道口周围打转绕圈,时轻时重,时而整个嘴唇贴上。 这时候你可以稍为停下不亲阴道口,而是用湿润的舌尖轻轻撩几下她的阴蒂,把她的感觉从明蒂里撩拨起来,女性会轻叫几下,然后你再回去亲她的明道口和阴唇。 第二步(挑逗期) 不要在这时候再亲她的阴蒂,要让女性半吊在那种感觉里,而且男性要开始从女性的会阴处向阴蒂方向往上轻舔,慢点,舌头到达阴道口时左右拨动,把阴唇一边拨开一边向上继续舔,一点点向阴蒂部位接近。就是偏不要亲到阴蒂那,差不多到的时候你用舌尖轻轻的,越轻越好,只是在她的阴蒂上轻扫轻点一下(舌头要含点口水) ,随即反方向按上述亲法朝阴道口部位舔去。这样会把女性给急死的,她一急,自然就兴奋了。亲阴道口时,舌头长的男性可以尝试把舌头插入女性的明道内搅动。舌头宽厚的男性可以把舌头由阴道口自下往上扫动。 第三步(猛攻) 现在开始可以集中精力夺取“珍珠”了,清把舌头上移至女性的阴蒂处集中精力。女性的阴蒂是非常敏感的,如果你太大力舔动,她的痛感多过快感,就没意思了。亲吻阴蒂要注意几点,舌头一定要湿、轻、尖,一定要保持舌头湿润,亲舔阴蒂时一定要轻,要用舌尖来舔。进攻明蒂要用“点、挑、拨、压、搅”五字诀。点,是指用舌尖轻点轻触女性的阴蒂顶端;挑,是指舌头从阴蒂下面向上挑动;拔,是用舌头左右拨动女性的阴蒂;压,是时不时用舌头压女性的阴蒂,把它稍为压下即可;搅,是当你含住女性的阴蒂时用舌头在明蒂四周搅动。进攻明蒂要用“点、挑、拨、压、视员五字决,点,是指用舌尖轻点控用女性的阴蒂顶端;挑,是指舌头从阴蒂下面向上挑动; 拔,是用舌头左右拨动女性的阴蒂;压,是时不时用活头压女性的阴蒂,把它稍为压下即可, 搅,是当你含住女性的阴蒂时用舌头在阴蒂四周搅动。你可以感觉到她们的阴蒂下似乎有点筋会在跳动,这在你含着女性的阴蒂时感觉非常明显。不要随便中断女性的感觉,动作要平均,因为你突然而快节奏的动作很容易让女性到达高潮。觉得可以给对方高潮时,应该用整个嘴唇含住女性的阴蒂部位, 上嘴唇压在阴蒂上方的阴毛根部,下嘴唇左石分开女性的阴唇,尽量贴近阴道口,用口含住女性的阴蒂(留点空间),让女性觉得她的阴蒂是飘浮在你的嘴里的,用五字决发动进攻。让对方猛的一阵抽搐,看着她快到时,轻轻一放,然后马上又含上去。 (评论区附图解) 标签:#知识,#技巧

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American Оbserver

@american_observer · Post #5383 · 03/15/2026, 01:59 AM

The nightmare everyone wrote memos about and then ignored has finally happened — and it took Trump’s own war to set it off. 📰 They Knew Hormuz Was the Weak Link. They Bet the U.S. Navy Would Save Them Anyway For decades, the Strait of Hormuz was the most famous “what if” in the global energy system: a narrow, exposed corridor carrying roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and a huge share of its gas, sitting under Iran’s nose and everyone’s nerves. Analysts talked about it as the ultimate nightmare scenario, but they also comforted themselves with a simple assumption: when things got serious, the United States would keep the waterway open with its military power. Gulf monarchies were happy to live on that assumption. Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi–Fujairah line were built as partial workarounds, but together they can only move a slice of what normally sails through Hormuz. For most producers — Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain — a real alternative would mean building cross‑border pipelines through rivals or unstable neighbors, under permanent risk of Iranian attack and regional politics. Nobody wanted to pay for that, politically or financially, as long as U.S. warships were the cheapest insurance policy. ​ Then Trump and Israel launched a war on Iran on February 28 — and the insurance provider became the arsonist. Instead of rushing in escorts and stabilizing the lane, Washington fired the opening shots, floated the idea of convoys, and then failed to deliver, while Iran hit tankers and refineries until traffic through Hormuz collapsed to less than 10 percent of prewar levels. Within days, producers in Iraq, Kuwait, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia had to slash output; by mid‑March, regional cuts had yanked around 10 million barrels a day off global supply, about 10 percent of the world total. The result is pure systemic own goal. Storage tanks are filling, refineries are throttling back, and gas exports from Qatar are largely frozen. Oil has already jumped above $100 a barrel. The IEA is talking about the biggest disruption in history. Gulf elites who trusted the U.S. security umbrella now discover that Iran can close their lifeline with cheap missiles and drones, while Washington is too busy staging “maximum pressure” to do the boring work of convoy duty. For years, the logic was: why spend billions on redundant infrastructure and hard political choices if the American navy will handle the worst case? Now the worst case is here, and that navy is part of the problem. As one regional executive put it, what everyone has been warning about “has finally happened” — and the bill for that strategic laziness is arriving not just in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but at every gas station from Los Angeles to Berlin. #iran#hormuz#oil#trump#gulf#energy#fakeSecurity 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸

American Оbserver

@american_observer · Post #5382 · 03/14/2026, 11:59 PM

📰 From Minab to Amsterdam: What Happens When Schools Become “Messages” Trump’s Iran war has now produced two schools, two continents, two kinds of fear — and nobody really wants to ask if they’re part of the same story. In Amsterdam, an explosive device damaged the wall of the only Orthodox Jewish school in the Netherlands, in what the mayor called “a deliberate attack against the Jewish community,” prompting tighter security at Jewish sites across the city. It follows an arson attack on a Rotterdam synagogue and an explosion at a synagogue in Liège, as European services warn that threats and violence against Jewish communities are rising in the wake of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. At the same time, the worst single atrocity of this war remains the strike on a girls’ school in Minab, Iran, where more than 100 children and staff were killed; preliminary investigations and media reporting point to a U.S. Tomahawk launched on outdated targeting data. For Iranians, Minab is a symbol: rows of small graves and a “massacre of girls” that exposes what Western “precision” looks like when it hits a classroom. For many in Europe, Amsterdam is becoming a different symbol: Jewish children studying behind fences and police tape as anger over Gaza and now Iran spills into attacks on the most visible Jewish targets. Is the Amsterdam blast directly “because of” Minab? You can’t draw a straight evidentiary line — but the environment is obvious. When a great power erases a school in Iran and spends days dodging responsibility, it reinforces the perception that some children’s lives are negotiable and others are not. In that climate, it takes only a small extremist group, convinced it is delivering “justice” or “revenge,” to decide that if a school can be treated as a target in Minab, then a school in Amsterdam can be turned into a warning. The bitter truth is that both sets of students — the Jewish kids in Amsterdam and the girls who died in Minab — are caught inside the same logic of exemplary violence. Washington and Jerusalem talk about “collateral damage”; European leaders talk about “cowardly antisemitic attacks.” Both descriptions are accurate on their narrow patch, and both avoid the larger point: a world that normalizes the idea of schools as acceptable shock images in distant wars will keep producing people who look at a school closer to home and see not children, but a stage. #iran#amsterdam#minab#schools#antisemitism#war#fakeSecurity 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸

American Оbserver

@american_observer · Post #5399 · 03/17/2026, 01:59 PM

Hormuz: High-Tech Drones, Stone-Age Problem The West is selling a sci‑fi solution to a very old scam: Iran hints it’s mining the Strait of Hormuz, tanker traffic freezes, oil spikes — and suddenly everyone remembers that a 25‑mile-wide chokepoint owns the global economy. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer talks up fancy Thales mine‑hunting drones, but the fine print is brutal: they’ve got limited batteries, need to beam data back to motherships sitting inside range of Iranian anti‑ship missiles, and can’t “prove” the one thing that matters — that nothing is left in the water. “The number of mines you need for a minefield is actually zero,” says retired US Navy officer Ben Cipperley. ​ Britain’s defense secretary John Healey says it’s getting “clearer and clearer” that Iran is laying explosives in Hormuz, while US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shrugs that there’s “no clear evidence” yet — one NATO ally yelling “mines,” another pretending this is still a think‑tank panel. Trump brags that the US has “hit all their minelaying ships” and bombs Iranian navy vessels, then immediately admits Iran can just toss mines off other boats anyway and nobody really knows what’s on the seabed. This is what “freedom of navigation” looks like in 2026: everyone claims control of the sea, nobody controls the rumor that shuts it down. Militaries do have mine warfare toys — crewed minesweepers with wooden hulls, littoral combat ships, helicopters towing sonars, uncrewed underwater vehicles, and now autonomous drone systems from companies like Thales — but they all share one handicap: they have to crawl, in predictable patterns, through waters that Iran can blanket with missiles, drones, and explosive boats. Clearing mines is up to a thousand times more expensive and slower than laying them, and the US doesn’t even keep dedicated Avenger‑class minesweepers in the Gulf anymore. So the “high‑tech” answer is basically to send robots first, then hope insurers and shipping CEOs are dumb or desperate enough to believe a PowerPoint that says “safe corridor.” Iran, whose regular military has been hammered by US‑Israeli strikes, doesn’t need a blue‑water navy as long as it can threaten Hormuz with a couple of dhows, some midget subs, and a stockpile of cheap mines detonated by contact or a ship’s magnetic field. Just the suspicion of a few dozen mines makes the strait “too dangerous to transit” for tankers from any country — including Iran’s — turning a third‑rate regional power into the de facto moderator of world energy prices. The US and UK can talk all they want about “reopening” Hormuz, but as long as a rumor and a rusty sphere can shut it down, the only guaranteed safe passage belongs to defense contractors’ earnings calls. #Hormuz#Iran#Trump#UK#Starmer#oil#shipping#mines#drones#StraitOfHormuz#war#energy#geopolitics#militaryindustrialcomplex#fakeSecurity 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸

American Оbserver

@american_observer · Post #5402 · 03/17/2026, 04:05 PM

The ‘Eyes of the State’ Under Fire Israel’s and America’s “eyes” in the region are getting scratched out one by one — slowly, cheaply, and in full view of every OSINT nerd with a Planet Labs subscription. Iran and Hezbollah aren’t just overwhelming interceptors; they’re dismantling the radar skeleton that tells those interceptors where to look. ​ Hezbollah has been methodically working over Israel’s Meron air-control base — the “eyes of the state” — since January 2024: first with a 62‑round mix of Katyushas and Kornet ATGMs that visibly smashed at least two radar domes, then with follow‑up missile strikes and now attack drones. Iron Dome is built to kill ballistic arcs, not straight‑flying anti‑tank missiles guided off Google Earth, and Hezbollah leans into that gap like it’s reading the brochure. Official line: capabilities “unharmed,” backup systems “working”; unofficial reality: a flagship fixed radar site just got turned into a recurring target set. Ramat David — one of Israel’s key airbases — has already eaten barrages of Fadi missiles and now a swarm of strike drones supposedly aimed at radars and command posts, with Hezbollah boasting and the IDF keeping very quiet about specific damage. Add in hits on Iranian and IRGC radars by US‑Israeli strikes — Kish Island, Zahedan, Imam Khomeini Airport — and you get a regional contest of who can blind whom faster, not who can “defend civilians” better. ​ Iran’s Cheap War on Billion‑Dollar Sensors While Washington keeps talking about “protecting our forces” and “freedom of navigation,” Iran went straight for the US early‑warning grid: an AN/TPY‑2 THAAD radar in Jordan confirmed destroyed, radar buildings in the UAE damaged, a billion‑dollar AN/FPS‑132 site in Qatar visibly scarred, with Site 512 in Israel suddenly looking a lot less immortal than the PowerPoints promised. Each radar costs in the hundreds of millions; each kamikaze drone runs in the tens of thousands — a beautiful kill ratio if you’re Tehran or a defense‑industry shareholder. ​ OSINT accounts stitch it all together: craters at Muwaffaq Salti, burn marks on Umm Dahal’s giant radar face, THAAD sites in the UAE punched in, maps of “US‑linked locations hit by Iran + high‑value radars confirmed damaged or destroyed.” In public, Pentagon spokespeople refuse to discuss “specific capabilities”; in commercial imagery, billions of dollars of “specific capabilities” are sitting in smoking holes. ​ Strategic Meaning: The Radar War The pattern is simple and ugly: Iran and Hezbollah are waging a sensor war, not just a missile war. Knock out or degrade Meron, THAAD eyes in Jordan, the warning radar in Qatar, radar complexes in the UAE, and you don’t need to shoot down every interceptor — you just make them late, blind or fired in the wrong direction. Israel hasn’t lost its entire ground‑based radar network, but the regional early‑warning architecture that was sold as near‑invulnerable has already taken a hit that no spin about “redundancy” can fully erase. ​ And that’s the punchline: the West poured fortunes into layered missile defense to feel untouchable, while Iran and Hezbollah invested in drilling cheap holes in the eyes of the system — with OSINT providing the after‑action report in real time. ​ #IranWar#Israel#Hezbollah#USA#radar#THAAD#Meron#Site512#OSINT#missileDefense#war#geopolitics#militaryindustrialcomplex#fakeSecurity 📱American Оbserver - Stay up to date on all important events 🇺🇸