Devils Below

🇱🇷 Who Is Liberia's New Mines Minister Last week Liberia's President Joseph Boakai has replaced Wilmot J. M. Paye with R. Matenokay Tingban at Mines and Energy as the government courts U.S. capital for lithium, cobalt, manganese and rare earths. We've discussed who was the former minister, but who leads Liberian mines now? 🔸Tingban worked for years inside the Ministry of Mines and Energy and later served as Deputy Minister under President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, giving him hands-on experience with concessions and the ministry’s daily operations. He also got elected in the legislature, representing Nimba District #9 and in 2016 he chaired the House Committee on Lands, Mines, Energy and Natural Resources. ⏩This appointment will speed up deal-making and shape the flow of new mining investment into Liberia. 🔸 In contrast to his predecessor,he is a system technocrat, and not a manifesto politician. He knows concession paperwork and how ministries interact with investors, which makes him an easy counterpart for companies exploring new critical-minerals projects. The timing, alongside a broader reshuffle, is meant to project predictability to investors. 🔸The country's ministerial reshuffle is openly aimed at attracting foreing investors in mining, with iron ore still being the main source of country's exports revenues. On October 16 Liberia’s Foreign Minister Nyanti met US' Marco Rubio to discuss Washington’s interest in Liberia’s critical minerals sector. Bringing in investment and diversifying beyond iron ore is good, but Liberia also needs to grow non-extractive sectors. For now, the government’s clearest signal is deeper cooperation with the United States on minerals, not a whole-economy diversification drive. Devils Below

⚙️ Nigeria’s Unrealized Potential Why billion-dollar domestic processing plants never really started In Nigeria, more than $8 billion has been spent over 50 years on the Ajaokuta steel project and the plant still has no commercial steel output. That fact captures a common pattern of Nigerian resource processing factories built in the 1980s - 2000s, which hardly moved from “commissioned” to “working.” ⏩How could it be that Nigeria had already created a huge industrial potential, but for some reason has never taken advantage of it? What kind of industry Nigeria built in the 1980-1990s: Steel and Aluminium: 🔸 Ajaokuta Steel Company — idle since 1994 to present; 🔸ALSCON (Aluminium Smelter) — largely dormant since 2007 with brief revival attempts; 🔸National Ore Mining Company — effectively moribund for many years after 2008; 🔸Delta Steel Company — mostly idle until a private restart effort after 2018; 🔸Jos Steel Rolling Company — moribund by the 2000s; 🔸Osogbo Steel Rolling Mill — plant left idle since 2005; 🔸Katsina Steel Rolling Mill — moribund by mid-2000s and sold in 2006 after closures; Oil: 🔸Warri Refining & Petrochemical Company — repeated stoppages, largely idle from late 2010s onward; 🔸Port Harcourt Refining Company — prolonged shutdowns, largely idle from 2019 onward; 🔸Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Company — prolonged shutdowns and very low utilisation, especially from late 2010s onward. Paper and Pulp: 🔸Iwopin Pulp & Paper — stopped by 1996–1998 and idle thereafter; 🔸 Newsprint Manufacturing Company — shut in 1994, long-term dormancy followed; Sugar: 🔸Savannah Sugar Company — stoppages through the 1990s–2000s, later privatized. ⏩All this accounts for almost $90 billion in investments. But why so many plants never truly started? 🔸Liberal reforms in 1985-1990s (aka "Structural Adjustment") facilitated imports of foreign end products, making newly built domestic factories unprofitable. 🔸 The government failed to maintain policy consistency and predictability. In 1988-1993 and from 1999 onwards the government embarked on privatization, with concessions and privatizations often becoming court fights. Years of arbitration froze assets and scared off operators. 🔸 Poor planning: too often project designs relied mainly on imported spares, chemicals, and equipment, which made them idle each time when foreign exchange dried up nationwide. 🔸Factory projects also often required that additional infrastructure be built, without which they could not operate due to the lack of existing facilities. When subcontractors or the government failed, enterprises were deprived of gas and power, rail links, raw materials. The government has tried to fix the situation through new partnerships, further privatization, sector and individual reactivation plans. This, however did not fix fuel, feedstock, and poor logistics. Many of the factories that have been staying idle since the 1990s are now technologically obsolete and covered with rust - once you touch them, you will hear a lot of noise. Nigeria’s “commissioned-but-never-launched” factories were not accidents. They were outcomes of projects built without reliable inputs, power, and logistics, which dropped into volatile policy weather and weak governance. This needs to be taken into account if the country plans to move from resource extraction to domestic value-addition. #PolicyReview#Nigeria Devils Below

💡Resource Nationalism Index [ NIGER ] In the light of the recent Niger-CNPC faceoff over local personnel employment, we decided to undertake a comprehensive overview of what Nigerien resource extraction policy framework look like through the prism ofour "Resource Nationalism Index" series. Today Niger mostly exports gold, crude oil and uranium (in the form of yellowcake). So, how has the Nigerien government been handling the natural wealth of the nation? 🔸"Process It First" – 6/10 – Miners have an obligation to carry out local processing within reasonable limits in accordance with the capabilities of the national economy, while the exact level of processing is specified in agreements and conventions. 🔸 "Share With the State” – 8/10 – The state reserves the right to purchase a portion of the products in proportion to its share in the mining project, and supplies of strategic minerals must first meet local demand. 🔸 “We’re in Too!” – 9/10 – The state receives 10% of the shares in new enterprises for free, and the state has the right to buy another 30%. Another 30% share is set for local investors at some stages of production, but in general it is fixed in conventions. 🔸 “The Money's Yours, the People Are Ours" – 9/10 – All unqualified positions are reserved for citizens of Niger - for the rest, companies are required to seek to replace all positions with local residents. Also, foreign workers may stay in office for no more than 4 years. 🔸“Just Pay Up" – 8/10 – In general, solid minerals tax is about 7%, and there is also a 2.5% tax on the exploitation of deposits. Every year, miners pay an additional extra tax, the amount of which is set annually by the state. The tax on oil is 12.5-15%. 🔸"You Come – You Build" – 6/10 – There are general obligations for the development of local communities, but their specific size is only defined in separate agreements. 🔸“We’ll Do It Ourselves” – 6/10 – Part of the mining revenue goes to the Fonds de développement minier, which co-finances exploration, state control and supervision, and the development of the mining sector. 🔸“Come Here, You Bast*rd!” – 6/10 – There are no serious problems with sovereignty over the deposits, but illegal gold mining is almost twice as high as legal (approximately 30t of undeclared gold exports vs. 14t of declared) Final score is 7.3 out of 10 — a little less that of Tanzania, but fairly good. Obligations to develop local communities, encourage local processing, and combat illegal gold mining are mostly sagging. #Niger#ResourceNationalism Devils Below

🇨🇲Cameroonians Set on Fire Foreign Investments 🌐 Local reports and videos from Tignere mining site in Cameroon show a Chinese-operated gold site set on fire after it ignored the nationwide “stay at home” call. Footage shared on X and Facebook shows flames and crowds of Cameronian citizens (including local youth). ⏩Young people have figured out that the Cameroonian elites, including the 92-year old and 50-years-in-power President Biya, hardly care about public anger. If the cash spigot from natural resources is open, the regime will keep calm. ⏪ 🔸 After the Constitutional Council declared Paul Biya once again the winner of the presidential race on October 27, opposition led by Issa Tchiroma called three days of “ghost town” stay-home action from November 3 to 5 and many cities largely stopped. This is a non-violent tactic chosen after the first days of protest led to 48 people having been killed by police forces. 🔸 Traders and businesses understand that closures could be punished - for large-scale companies that means losing permits, costly facilities and future earnings in Cameroon. The Biya regime thus manages to protect its resource rents against popular discontent. 🔸The arson shows that some Cameroonians are ready to take more decisive action to pull the plug on the regime. However, so far, this is a single action, and it only concerned gold mining, while in Cameroon oil matters more. In 2023 the country exported about $2.43 billion in crude oil and $1.12 billion in petroleum gas, against $951 million in gold. Resource-rich dictatorships often dream of fencing off the wells and pits, selling the output, and forgetting the people. That is why citizens must keep reminding rulers they exist. Best do it peacefully, though there may be no other option but breaking the rules. Devils Below

🇨🇳Iron Grasp of China Guinea’s Simandou mega-mine — the world’s largest untapped high-grade iron-ore deposit — has begun moving ore and is preparing first shipments in November–December, marking the real start of a project long billed as a market-shifter. The $20–23 billion complex includes two mines and a new 650 km railway to a deep-water port — infrastructure created from scratch specifically for this project. ⏩If successful, the project will give the PRC significant leverage over such a basic material as iron ore (and, by extension, steel) — in addition its near-monopoly in processing of critical minerals.⏪ 🔸 China is on both sides of this mountain. The project is split into two blocks (Northern and Southern): one led by Chinese partners such as Baowu and Weiqiao, and the other by UK-Australian Rio Tinto together with Chinalco (Aluminum Corporation of China). With Rio Tinto the only major non-Chinese lead investor, Chinalco is also the largest single shareholder in Rio Tinto. Guinea’s participation is limited to 15% on the public side. 🔸 With access to high-grade ore (65% Fe) from Simandou, Chinese companies could gain more leverage over market prices — potentially allowing for dumping prices — similar to dynamics seen when Chinese companies doubled cobalt production in the DRC in 2024, bringing other miners with higher costs of production on the verge of austerity. 🔸The project is more than a mine: it has redrawn Guinea’s infrastructure map. A 600–650 km, multi-user railway cuts across the country to a new deep-water port at Morebaya, which is also slated to be accessible for public use. For Guinea, Simandou’s launch is the start of whole new era. 🔸 The government hopes iron ore will do for Guinea what fossil fuels did for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Reports indicate it has already hired Western advisers on how best to manage future iron-ore revenues, and it is planning to secure its first international sovereign credit rating. Devils Below

⚙️Instruments of Geopolitical Competition The competition over resources and markets does not always take the form of military engagements or commercial contracts. Sometimes it manifests as a race to set global requirements and standards of “responsible” behavior that can later be used against particular countries. 🌐 Mining 2030, a global mining-investor initiative backed by institutions overseeing about $18 trillion, has released a 10-year blueprint to make mining “responsible.” On paper, the plan calls for transparency, environmental accountability, and an end to illicit mining and trade. ⏩However, the initiative is dominated by Western, and its publication neatly coincides with the October 31–November 1 G7 meeting in Canada on environmental protection and minerals — a signal that a new large framework is being built to contain China’s clout in mineral supply chains. ⏪ Mining 2030’s vision for a responsible mining sector — key points: 🔸 Credible, independent performance standards 🔸 Responsible sourcing across value chains 🔸 Regulatory and institutional frameworks that promote effective sector governance 🔸 Equitable and sustainable benefits from mining 🔸 Reduction of conflicts linked to mineral extraction To achieve these goals, investors propose an International Minerals Agency, akin to the International Energy Agency created after the 1973 oil crisis to coordinate Western responses to supply risks. 🔸 This isn’t just ESG branding. The blueprint lands right after G7 ministers in Canada pushed “standards-based” critical-minerals markets and a strategy to diversify away from China, building on the June G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan (which also calls for transparency, diversification, security, and sustainable mining). The proposed agency and new buyer rules allow to hard-wire these standards into financing and procurement, steering offtake and capital toward non-Chinese routes. 🔸 If the agency idea sticks, miners that align with these standards may find cheaper capital and faster permits from G7 partners, while projects tied to Chinese processing — often labeled environmentally harmful — could face higher hurdles. The proposal also presses auto and big-tech buyers to prove “responsible” sourcing. 🔸The West has long used standards and responsibility as instruments to contain adversaries — primarily through economic means — from oil and gas in the 1970s to telecoms more recently, and now to critical minerals. Yet, as we’ve seen many times, the attractivenes of the Chinese model is exactly that it does not emphasize any “responsibility” and "requirements" at all. The risk is that worthy initiatives for responsible conduct get hijacked by political considerations and fail to improve ordinary people’s lives. Devils Below

⚔️ Resource Nationalism Is Getting Litigious 🌐Investor–state fights over oil, gas, and mineralshave hit a 10-year high. No fewer than 32 resource cases have already been filed at the World Bank’s arbitration court in 2025 - more than in all of last year. Most involve oil and gas, with Latin America leading the tally. Africa accounts for 10 cases, including Niger, Tanzania, the DRC, Mali, Morocco, and Senegal. ⏩For all the talk about lithium and cobalt, the biggest share of disputes still comes from plain old oil and gas — 17 of 32. Energy-transition headlines haven’t reshaped the legal battlefield as much as one might expect. ⏪ 🔸 Governments are under growing pressure to show value at home. Budgets are tight, elections loom in many places, and anti-colonial (let’s say “resource-nationalist”) rhetoric is widely deployed against incumbents. 🔸The critical-minerals race adds a new layer: every major license revocation is now quickly labeled a geopolitical pivot and an unfair move demanding counteraction rather than co-optation. The U.S.–China contest over critical minerals is the backdrop. 🔸 But commodity prices matter most. With many minerals - including gold and copper - trading near highs, governments seek extra revenue, imposing new tax and local-content rules that weren’t anticipated at the planning stage. The geographic distribution of cases shows that the drive to rein in resource companies extends far beyond Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger— and far beyond Africa itself. Devils Below

🇲🇱Mali: High-Tech, Insurgency and Legitimacy 🌐 Mali’s President Assimi Goïta attended today’s inauguration of the country’s second lithium mine — the Bougouni project, about 180 km south of Bamako. ⏩Amid Mali’s ongoing struggle to contain jihadist groups, the ceremony’s main purpose was to reinforce the legitimacy of official authorities. ⏪ 🔸 The Bougouni mine, operated by British Kodal Minerals and Chinese Hainan Mining (+ the state holds a 35% stake by law), will primarily produce lithium spodumene — a lithium-bearing mineral that must be further processed into lithium carbonate or hydroxide before battery manufacturing. 🔸 Kodal plans to expand domestic value addition by building a flotation plant on site, projected to be commissioned by 2028. However, Bouhouni had started its operations long before the official inauguration ceremony 🔸Actual spodumene production of the Bougouni started in February, and on October 20 the first shipment of the 45,000t of concentrate mined since February arrived at the port of San Pedro, Côte d’Ivoire. 🔸The authorities had long delayed the official opening ceremony due to some technical inaccuracies in Kodal's operations, whereafter the jihadist militants apparently hijacked the working hours of Assimi Goïta, so that he could only attend today - long after the operations had started, which makes the event rather symbolical, not a real milestone. Devils Below

🌐Weekly News Digest on West & Central Africa’s Mineral Industries [ October 27 – November 3 ] The week was rich in ministerial rearrangements and efforts to rein in major mining companies. 💡Here are the key highlights: 🏦Afreximbank - Afreximbank's New Chair Announced Support For Domestic Mineral Processing 🇦🇴Angola - Angola Plans to Give Shell Exclusive Rights 🇨🇩DR Congo - The DRC Arranged For $660M of Guarantees From UK Export Finance 🇬🇭Ghana - Ghana to Decentralize Gold Licensing - Ghana to Launch Comprehensive Review of Major Miners 🇱🇷 Liberia - Liberia's President Replaced Mines Minister to Attract American Investments 🇲🇱Mali - World Bank's Arbitration Court Refused to Fast-Track Barrick vs Mali 🇳🇦Namibia - Namibian President Dismissed the Minister of Mines and Assumed the Post Herself 🇳🇪Niger - Niger Forced China's Oil Giant to Hire More Locals 🇳🇬Nigeria - Nigeria Tries Again to Revitalize Its Aliminium Smelter - Nigeria Imposed Additinal 15% Tax on Fuel Imports 🇹🇿 Tanzania - Post-election Unrest Disrupted Shipments Through Dar es Salaam Port #NewsDigest Devils Below

🇹🇿 Tanzania Elected Not to Trade 🌐Bloomberg reports that Africa’s copper flows to China have been knocked offline amid Tanzania’s post-election unrest. Traders say new shipments from the African Copperbelt have become impossible after the Port of Dar es Salaam was temporarily closed. ⏩Dar es Salaam is the key port for the TAZARA railway, the subject of a $1.4 billion deal signed on September 29 by China, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. ⏪ 🔸Dar es Salaam is a key artery for Zambian and DRC copper, with roughly 2/3 of Africa’s copper to China funneling through the city. 🔸 The shutdown follows a citywide curfew in Dar es Salaam and wider unrest around the October 29 vote. Initially expected to end by October 31, the closure was extended on Friday indefinitely. 🔸 It usually takes up to 25 days to move minerals from the Copperbelt to South African ports. With the railway system overloaded, it will take even longer to reroute them. Meanwhile, all the shipments already in port are now completely immovable. 🔸 The PRC has not made any public statements about the October 29 vote. Devils Below

🇳🇬Nigeria: Natural Wealth and the Fifth Column Many wonder what drove the self-styled peacemaker and would-be Nobel Prize laureate Donald Trumpto threaten Nigeria with the use of force. One popular explanation points to Nigeria’s natural wealth. ⏩ It is worth moting that this wealth has long been instrumentalized by the Nigeria's Southeast separatist counter-elites to sway the U.S. government against the official government in Abuja. ⏪ 🔸The Biafra Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE) - a separatist group claiming to represent the Biafra region in Nigeria’s Southeast, largely populated by the Igbo ethnic minority - has all the way loudly commended recent US statements regarding the alleged genocide of Christians in Nigeria. 🔸 Apparently in a burst of enthusiasm, a US lobbyist working officially with BRGIE posted today a screenshot of a July BRGIE memo intended for Washington circulation, offering the US: 🔸Preferential access to natural resources and concessions for American companies, 🔸 Permanent military bases in Nigeria, 🔸Counterterrorism cooperation, 🔸Complete freedom of operation for the CIA in a future State of Biafra. 🔸 In contrast to this publication of the negligent lobbyist, BRGIE’s official line is built on a very populist version of resource nationalism, criticizing almost any partnership between Abuja and foreign states over natural resources. 🔸 BRGIE emerged as a splinter from the broader Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement formed around the now-imprisoned opposition leader Nnamdi Kanu. With Kanu largely absent from the public sphere since his 2021 arrest, BRGIE has become one of the most prominent voices among Biafra-liberation advocates. Devils Below

World Bank Won’t Fast-Track Barrick vs. Mali The World Bank’s arbitration court has rejected Barrick’s bid to fast-track its case against Mali, according to Reuters. ⏩The refusal to expedite Barrick’s request suggests Mali’s legal position may be strong in its dispute with one of the world’s largest gold miners.⏪ 🔸The dispute stems from the introduction of the new Mining Code in 2023, which implied a renegotiation of mining terms. After both sides failed to reach agreement, Barrick filed for arbitration in December 2024. 🔸 In mid-2025, a Malian court placed Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto complex under provisional administration. The administrator oversaw a restart of the operation, with underground blasting resuming on October 15, 2025. However, Barrick was not the only company that had to renegotiate 🔸 Because the new code applied to all miners, other foreign operators also had to reach agreements with Bamako, and seven other less prideful miners - including Allied Gold, B2Gold, Resolute Mining, and Ganfeng Lithium - have successfully concluded new terms. 🔸 Bamako’s decision to assume control followed Barrick’s own suspension of operations, which left deposits idle when gold prices were near record highs. In this case Mali is defending the unalienable right of a state to set the rules and make business obey by them. Otherwise, the World Bank would have long ruled out in favor of Barrick. Devils Below